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Self-enforcing collective counterterror retaliation
Oliveira, André L.; Silva, Emilson C. D. - In: Games 13 (2022) 1, pp. 1-16
Motivated by recent examples of collective effort on the war on terror, we examine the incentives that retaliation may …-specific benefits from retaliation enjoyed by each coalition member, the relatively lower spillover benefit from retaliation enjoyed by … the anticipated backlash from retaliation, which targets coalition members only. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013171770
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Giving and costless retaliation in the power-to-take game
Drouvelis, Michalis; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Shimada, Natsumi; … - 2023
Extending the power-to-take game, we explore the impact of two forces that may shape retaliation. In our 2x2 design, i … destroying their own endowment in retaliation, the responders can destroy the proposer's endowment. Although these added options …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014331767
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Altruism and envy in contests : an evolutionarily stable symbiosis
Konrad, Kai A. - 2002
Altruists and envious people who meet in contests are symbionts. They do better than a population of narrowly rational individuals. If there are only altruists and envious individuals, a particular mixture of altruists and envious individuals is evolutionarily stable.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011514081
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Where strategic and evolutionary stability depart : a study of minimal diversity games
Balkenborg, Dieter; Vermeulen, Dries - In: Mathematics of operations research 41 (2016) 1, pp. 278-292
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011448381
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The evolutionary stability of in-group altruism in productive and destructive group contests
Cheikbossian, Guillaume - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 188 (2021), pp. 236-252
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012658721
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Trade sanctions and the stability of climate coalitions
Hagen, Achim; Schneider, Jan - In: Journal of environmental economics and management : … 109 (2021), pp. 1-16
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013185978
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Brown-von Neumann-Nash Dynamics: The Continuous Strategy Case
Hofbauer, Josef; Oechssler, Jörg - 2005
In John Nash’s proofs for the existence of (Nash) equilibria based on Brouwer’s theorem, an iteration mapping is used. A continuous- time analogue of the same mapping has been studied even earlier by Brown and von Neumann. This differential equation has recently been suggested as a plausible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422131
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The Unique-lowest Sealed-bid Auction
Houba, Harold; van der Laan, Dinard; Veldhuizen, Dirk - 2008
Unique-lowest sealed-bid auctions are auctions in which participation is endogenous and the winning bid is the lowest bid among all unique bids. Such auctions admit very many Nash equilibria (NEs) in pure and mixed strategies. The two-bidders' auction is similar to the Hawk-Dove game, which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325775
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Brown-von Neumann-Nash Dynamics: The Continuous Strategy Case
Hofbauer, Josef; Oechssler, Jörg; Riedel, Frank - 2005
In John Nash’s proofs for the existence of (Nash) equilibria based on Brouwer’s theorem, an iteration mapping is used. A continuous—time analogue of the same mapping has been studied even earlier by Brown and von Neumann. This differential equation has recently been suggested as a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261668
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Finite-population 'Mass-Action' and evolutionary stability
Bernergard, Axel; Wärneryd, Karl - 2011
Nash proposed an interpretation of mixed strategies as the average pure-strategy play of a population of players randomly matched to play a normal-form game. If populations are finite, some equilibria of the underlying game have no such corresponding 'mass-action' equilibrium. We show that for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010275024