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by a draw from an Ellsberg urn. In a within-subject experiment, subjects make decisions in three different bargaining … mechanisms: unstructured bargaining, the Texas shoot-out, and a K + 1 auction. We find that the K +1 auction is the most e¢ cient … mechanism, which is in line with theory. Free format bargaining yields a surprising number of disagreements, which are not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014380287
messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010418867
conforming to Nash equilibrium behavior. We conduct an experiment on a minority-of-three game in which each player is a team …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011734522
We introduce a noncooperative multilateral bargaining model for a network-restricted environment, in which players can … communicate only with their neighbors. Each player strategically chooses the bargaining partners among the neighbors to buy out …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279698
We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached … by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non … existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of the agreement reachable through this bargaining process. We illustrate the consequences …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316539
We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however … bargaining solution is the unique stationary subgameperfect equilibrium. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011296159
favor and against this assumption and test in our own experiment, whether and which personality factors are useful in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326411
If two players of a simultaneous symmetric one-shot prisoner's dilemma hold standard prefer-ences, the fact that choosing the cooperative move imposes harm on a passive outsider is imma-terial. Yet if participants hold social preferences, one might think that they are reticent to impose harm on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009490177
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009722686
Using a laboratory experiment, we examine whether informal monetary sanctions can lead to better coordination in a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009567105