This paper characterizes equilibrium outcomes of extensive form games with incomplete information in which players can …-proof contracts and strategies for general extensive form games with incomplete information and apply our results to two-stage games …

maximum amount of information that can be transmitted in equilibrium is increasing in the bargaining power of the Sender … predict that information transmission is increasing in the Sender's relative bargaining power. This prediction is corroborated … by an experiment. Finally, we show how partial information transmission can lead to communication failure, and show how …

messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked …

than in either of the No Signal treatments. We also find that information about the other person's play appears to increase … this additional information are unable to overcome the apparent pessimism about the feasibility of coordination without a …

by a draw from an Ellsberg urn. In a within-subject experiment, subjects make decisions in three different bargaining … mechanisms: unstructured bargaining, the Texas shoot-out, and a K + 1 auction. We find that the K +1 auction is the most e¢ cient … mechanism, which is in line with theory. Free format bargaining yields a surprising number of disagreements, which are not …

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however … bargaining solution is the unique stationary subgameperfect equilibrium. …

We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached … by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non … existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of the agreement reachable through this bargaining process. We illustrate the consequences …

We introduce a noncooperative multilateral bargaining model for a network-restricted environment, in which players can … communicate only with their neighbors. Each player strategically chooses the bargaining partners among the neighbors to buy out …