particular, for a given coalition structure we study to what extend the stability of tax agreements is affected by the coalitions … means of a repeated game setting employing simple trigger strategies and we allow a sub-coalition to deviate from the … coalitional equilibrium. For a given form of punishment we are able to rank the stability of different coalition structures as …

particular, for a given coalition structure we study to what extend the stability of tax agreements is affected by the coalitions … means of a repeated game setting employing simple trigger strategies and we allow a sub-coalition to deviate from the … coalitional equilibrium. For a given form of punishment we are able to rank the stability of different coalition structures as …

messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked …

particular, for a given coalition structure we study to what extend the stability of tax agreements is affected by the coalitions … means of a repeated game setting employing simple trigger strategies and we allow a sub-coalition to deviate from the … coalitional equilibrium. For a given form of punishment we are able to rank the stability of different coalition structures as …

the non co-operative tax game. This result suggests that explicit forms of policy coordination, such as a centralised tax …