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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002878485
We study the impact of advice or observation on the depth of reasoning in an experimental beauty-contest game. Both sources of information trigger faster convergence to the equilibrium. Yet, we find that subjects who receive naive advice outperform uninformed subjects permanently, whereas...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293382
We examine gender differences in trust in another party's cooperation (CC) or its ability (AC). While men and women do not differ concerning trust in cooperation, gender has a strong influence when trust in another subject's ability is required.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293426
While most papers on team decision-making find that teams behave more selfishly, less trustingly and less altruistically than individuals, Cason and Mui (1997) report that teams are more altruistic than individuals in a dictator game. Using a within-subjects design we re-examine group...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293433
This paper examines the influence of third-party observation and third-party reward on behavior in an experimental prisoner's dilemma (PD) game. Whereas the existing literature on third-party intervention as a means to sustain social norms has dealt almost exclusively with third-party...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294776
We compare the behavior of car mechanics and college students as sellers in experimental credence goods markets. Finding largely similar behavior, we note much more overtreatment by car mechanics, probably due to decision heuristics they learned in their professional training.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294779
We study the impact of advice or observation on the depth of reasoning in an experimental beauty-contest game. Both sources of information trigger faster convergence to the equilibrium. Yet, we find that subjects who receive naïve advice outperform uninformed subjects permanently, whereas...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325406
Arad and Rubinstein (2012a) have designed a novel game to study level-k reasoning experimentally. Just like them, we find that the depth of reasoning is very limited and clearly different from equilibrium play. We show that such behavior is even robust to repetitions, hence there is, at best,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010397183
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003726230
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001998458