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Moderating Government
De Sinopoli, Francesco; Ferraris, Leo; Iannantuoni, Giovanna - 2013
We consider a model where policy motivated citizens vote in two simultaneous elections, one for the President who is elected by majority rule, in a single national district, and one for the Congressmen, each of whom is elected by majority rule in a local district. The policy to be implemented...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014180722
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Voting for burden sharing rules in public goods games
Gallier, Carlo; Kesternich, Martin; Sturm, Bodo - In: Environmental & resource economics : the official … 67 (2017) 3, pp. 535-557
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011760459
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Immunity to credible deviations from the truth
Barberà, Salvador; Berga Colom, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo - 2016
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011590472
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Power brokers : middlemen in legislative bargaining
Iaryczower, Matiás; Oliveros, Santiago - In: Journal of economic theory 162 (2016), pp. 209-236
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011593104
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Democracy for polarized committees : the tale of Blotto's lieutenants
Casella, Alessandra; Laslier, Jean-François; Macé, Antonin - In: Games and economic behavior 106 (2017), pp. 239-259
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011793699
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Moderating Government
De Sinopoli, Francesco; Ferraris, Leo; Iannantuoni, Giovanna - In: Social choice and welfare 45 (2015) 2, pp. 415-440
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377184
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Voting for Burden Sharing Rules in Public Goods Games
Gallier, Carlo - 2014
In this experiment, we endogenize the choice of which contribution scheme is implemented in a public goods game. We investigate three rule-based contribution schemes. In a first step, players agree on a common group provision level using the principle of the smallest common denominator....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013048145
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Public-goods games with endogenous institution-formation : experimental evidence on the effect of the voting rule
Funaki, Yukihiko; Li, Jiawen; Veszteg, Róbert F. - In: Games 8 (2017) 4, pp. 1-22
joint decisions inside the institution are made based on the plurality voting rule. We show that, comparing to the unanimity … voting rule, the plurality rule results in a significant and large decrease in the institution initiation rate, along with a … choice of the voting rule does not significantly affect the average contribution level or efficiency. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771301
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Equilibrium Refinement in Dynamic Voting Games
Acemoglu, Daron; Egorov, Georgij V.; Sonin, Konstantin - 2009
We propose two related equilibrium refinements for voting and agenda-setting games. Sequentially Weakly Undominated …-intuitive equilibria that arise naturally in dynamic voting games and games in which random or deterministic sequences of agenda …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014202604
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Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers
Jeong, Daeyoung - In: Journal of economic theory 180 (2019), pp. 50-80
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012131620