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Kishimoto, Shin - 2014

This paper considers general bargaining outcomes under coalition structures formed by an external patent holder and firms in oligopoly markets. The main propositions are as follows. For each coalition structure, the kernel is a singleton; thus, the number of licensees that maximizes the patent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013055203

The Gamma-Core and Coalition Formation

Chander, Parkash - 2007

This paper reinterprets the gamma-core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction … that a certain equilibrium of this game corresponds to the gamma-core assumption that when a coalition forms the remaining …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014074595

A Non-Cooperative Approach to the Compensation Rules for Primeval Games

Ju, Yuan; Borm, Peter - 2006

To model inter-individual externalities and analyze the associated compensation issue, Ju and Borm (2005) introduces a new game-theoretic framework, primeval games, and proposes, from a cooperative perspective, three compensation rules as solution concepts for primeval games: the marginalistic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014055109

Equity as a prerequisite for stable cooperation in a public-good economy: The core revisited

Buchholz, Wolfgang; Peters, Wolfgang - 2010

on the one hand and the core property of an allocation on the other. In particular we show that it is an inhomogeneous … sacrifice') which is derived from the egalitarian-equivalent concept suggested by Moulin (1987). We also develop a simple core … test by which it can be checked whether a given allocation is in the core thus being a possible outcome of a cooperative …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270530

Equity as a prerequisite for stable cooperation in a public-good economy : the core revisited

Buchholz, Wolfgang; Peters, Wolfgang - 2010

on the one hand and the core property of an allocation on the other. In particular we show that it is an inhomogeneous … sacrifice") which is derived from the egalitarian-equivalent concept suggested by Moulin (1987). We also develop a simple core … test by which it can be checked whether a given allocation is in the core thus being a possible outcome of a cooperative …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003983187

Equity as a Prerequisite for Stable Cooperation in a Public-Good Economy - The Core Revisited

Buchholz, Wolfgang; Peters, Wolfgang - 2021

on the one hand and the core property of an allocation on the other. In particular we show that it is an inhomogeneous … sacrifice”) which is derived from the egalitarian-equivalent concept suggested by Moulin (1987). We also develop a simple core … test by which it can be checked whether a given allocation is in the core thus being a possible outcome of a cooperative …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316192

Private Provision of a Discrete Public Good : Efficient Equilibria in the Private-Information Contribution Game

Barbieri, Stefano; Malueg, David A. - 2007

We study the voluntary provision of a discrete public good via the contribution game. Players independently and simultaneously make nonrefundable contributions to fund a discrete public good, which is provided if and only if the contributions are at least as great as the cost of production. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014051626

Playing against an apparent opponent : incentives for care, litigation, and damage caps under self-serving bias

Landeo, Claudia; Nikitin, Maksim I.; Izmalkov, Sergei - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009571775

Playing against an apparent opponent : incentives for care, litigation, and damage caps under self-serving bias

Landeo, Claudia; Nikitin, Maksim I.; Izmalkov, Sergei - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009571781

Efficiency in the trust game : an experimental study of preplay contracting

Bracht, Juergen (contributor); Feltovich, Nick (contributor) - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003391031