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Kishimoto, Shin - 2014

This paper considers general bargaining outcomes under coalition structures formed by an external patent holder and firms in oligopoly markets. The main propositions are as follows. For each coalition structure, the kernel is a singleton; thus, the number of licensees that maximizes the patent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013055203

The Gamma-Core and Coalition Formation

Chander, Parkash - 2007

This paper reinterprets the gamma-core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction … that a certain equilibrium of this game corresponds to the gamma-core assumption that when a coalition forms the remaining …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014074595

A Non-Cooperative Approach to the Compensation Rules for Primeval Games

Ju, Yuan; Borm, Peter - 2006

To model inter-individual externalities and analyze the associated compensation issue, Ju and Borm (2005) introduces a new game-theoretic framework, primeval games, and proposes, from a cooperative perspective, three compensation rules as solution concepts for primeval games: the marginalistic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014055109

Equity as a prerequisite for stable cooperation in a public-good economy: The core revisited

Buchholz, Wolfgang; Peters, Wolfgang - 2010

on the one hand and the core property of an allocation on the other. In particular we show that it is an inhomogeneous … sacrifice') which is derived from the egalitarian-equivalent concept suggested by Moulin (1987). We also develop a simple core … test by which it can be checked whether a given allocation is in the core thus being a possible outcome of a cooperative …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270530

Equity as a Prerequisite for Stable Cooperation in a Public-Good Economy - The Core Revisited

Buchholz, Wolfgang; Peters, Wolfgang - 2021

on the one hand and the core property of an allocation on the other. In particular we show that it is an inhomogeneous … sacrifice”) which is derived from the egalitarian-equivalent concept suggested by Moulin (1987). We also develop a simple core … test by which it can be checked whether a given allocation is in the core thus being a possible outcome of a cooperative …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316192

Equity as a prerequisite for stable cooperation in a public-good economy : the core revisited

Buchholz, Wolfgang; Peters, Wolfgang - 2010

on the one hand and the core property of an allocation on the other. In particular we show that it is an inhomogeneous … sacrifice") which is derived from the egalitarian-equivalent concept suggested by Moulin (1987). We also develop a simple core … test by which it can be checked whether a given allocation is in the core thus being a possible outcome of a cooperative …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003983187

Optimal Provision of a Discrete Public Good : Linear Equilibria in the Private-Information Subscription Game

Barbieri, Stefano - 2008

We analyze a symmetric Bayesian game in which two players individually contribute to fund a discrete public good; contributions are refunded if they do not meet a threshold set by the seller of the good. We provide a general characterization of symmetric equilibrium strategies that are continuous...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012726475

Private Provision of a Discrete Public Good : Continuous-Strategy Equilibria in the Private-Information Subscription Game

Barbieri, Stefano; Malueg, David A. - 2007

We reconsider Laussel and Palfrey's (2003) analysis of private provision of a discrete public good via the subscription game. We show that the equilibria they define as semi-regular do not exist. Taking players' values for the public good as uniformly distributed on [vl, vh] with vl 0, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014050790

Private Provision of a Discrete Public Good : Efficient Equilibria in the Private-Information Contribution Game

Barbieri, Stefano; Malueg, David A. - 2007

We study the voluntary provision of a discrete public good via the contribution game. Players independently and simultaneously make nonrefundable contributions to fund a discrete public good, which is provided if and only if the contributions are at least as great as the cost of production. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014051626

Efficiency in the trust game : an experimental study of preplay contracting

Bracht, Juergen (contributor); Feltovich, Nick (contributor) - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003391031