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What explains significant variation across countries in the use of vote buying instead of campaign promises to secure voter support? This paper explicitly models the tradeoff parties face between engaging in vote buying and making campaign promises, and explores the distributional consequences...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011521218
We introduce a noncooperative multilateral bargaining model for a network-restricted environment, in which players can communicate only with their neighbors. Each player strategically chooses the bargaining partners among the neighbors to buy out their communication links with upfront transfers....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279698
In a society composed of a ruler and its citizens: what are the determinants of the political equilibrium between these two? This paper approaches this problem as a game played between a ruler who has to decide the distribution of the aggregate income and a group of agents/citizens who have the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011600156
We consider a model where policy motivated citizens vote in two simultaneous elections, one for the President who is elected by majority rule, in a single national district, and one for the Congressmen, each of whom is elected by majority rule in a local district. The policy to be implemented...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014180722
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012583377
We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two parties competing in a binary election may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises (platforms) that are contingent upon the outcome...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003778860
To enact a policy, a leader needs votes from committee members with heterogeneous opposition intensities. She sequentially offers transfers in exchange for votes. The transfers are either promises paid only if the policy passes or paid up front. With transfer promises, a vote costs nearly zero....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013222525
To enact a policy, a leader needs votes from committee members with heterogeneous opposition intensities. She sequentially offers transfers in exchange for votes. The transfers are either promises paid only if the policy is put to a vote or paid up front. With transfer promises, the leader buys...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012832737
produce for the endogenous formation of an international counterterror coalition. We show that there are quite reasonable … counterterror coalition, holding the choices of all other nations as given. The incentives to join the coalition are the group …-specific benefits from retaliation enjoyed by each coalition member, the relatively lower spillover benefit from retaliation enjoyed by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013171770
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001365861