We elicit reciprocal preferences in a firm-worker gift-exchange setting and relate them to actual behavior in a repeated gift-exchange game. We find that only a small minority of 10 percent of workers is materially selfish whereas 90 percent exhibit reciprocal preferences. However, the intensity...

This paper considers the estate division problem from a non-cooperative perspective. The integer claim game initiated by ONeill 1982 and extended by Atlamaz et al. 2011 is generalized by considering different sharing rules to divide every interval among the claimants. For problems with an estate...

We consider a cheap-talk setting that mimics the situation where an incumbent firm the sender is endowed with incentives to understate the true size of the market demand to two potential entrants the receivers. Although our experimental data reveals that senders messages convey truthful...

We study the evolution of imitation behaviour in a differentiated market where firms are located equidistantly on a Salop circle. Firms choose price and quantity simultaneously, leaving open the possibility for non-market clearing outcomes. The strategy of the most successful firm is imitated....

We study the division of a surplus under majoritarian bargaining in the three-person case. In a stationary equilibrium as derived by Baron and Ferejohn 1989, the proposer offers one third times the discount factor of the surplus to a second player and allocates no payoff to the third player, a...

In this note, we introduce a new sufficient condition, called sign-quasiconcavity, on the existence of a pure equilibrium in two-person symmetric zerosum games, which generalizes both generalized ordinal potentials Monderer and Shapley, 1996 and quasiconcavity Duerschet al., 2012.

We introduce a new concept which extends von Neumann and Morgensterns maximin strategy solution by incorporating individual rationality of the players. Maximin equilibrium, extending Nashs value approach, is based on the evaluation of the strategic uncertainty of the whole game. We show that...

We study strategic negotiation models featuring costless delay, general recognition procedures, endogenous voting orders, and finite sets of alternatives. Two examples show 1. non-existence of stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium SSPE. 2. the recursive equations and optimality conditions are...

At each moment in time, some alternative from a finite set is selected by a dynamic process. Players observe the alternative selected and sequentially cast a yes or a no vote. If the set of players casting a yes–vote is decisive for the alternative in question,the alternative is accepted...

Using a network approach we provide a characterization of a separating equilibrium for standard signaling games where the senders payoff function is quasi-linear. Given a strategy of the sender, we construct a network where the node set and the length between two nodes are the set of the senders...