Showing 1 - 10 of 125
We consider the regret matching process with finite memory. For general games in normal form, it is shown that any … for any large but finite choice of the memory bound. -- Regret Matching ; Nash Equilibria ; Closed Sets under Same or …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008688945
within a fixed set (fixed matching) or they are randomly matched to play the game (random matching). The relevant long run …. -- Fixed and Random Matching ; Incomplete Information ; Ex-Post Regret Learning ; Nash Equilibrium ; Ex-Post Equilibrium …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008688967
leads to an equilibrium matching friction. We argue that these allocations can be achieved in a non-cooperative equilibrium … if wages are determined by ex post bidding. This holds true even in finite-sized markets where the equilibrium-matching …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014067340
within a fixed set (fixed matching) or they are randomly matched to play the game (random matching). The relevant long run …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142432
We consider the regret matching process with finite memory. For general games in normal form, it is shown that any …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142570
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003807183
This paper provides two conditions of epistemic robustness, robustness to alternative best replies and robustness to non-best replies, and uses them to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies. -- epistemic game theory ; epistemic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003823241
In this paper we study a model where non-cooperative agents may exchange knowledge in a competitive environment. As a potential factor that could induce the knowledge disclosure between humans we consider the timing of the moves of players. We develop a simple model of a multistage game in which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008664165
We report experimental and theoretical results on the minority of three-game where three players have to choose one of two alternatives independently and the most rewarding alternative is the one chosen by a single player. This coordination game has many asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008689027
In the dynamic game we analyze, players are the members of a fixed network. Everyone is initially endowed with an information item that he is the only player to hold. Players are offered a finite number of periods to centralize the initially dispersed items in the hands of any one member of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003950474