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This paper shows that reciprocity comes from the desire to cooperate in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game …. Before playing the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game, players choose the reciprocity level and commit to it, and the … reciprocity level is public information. There are T equilibria if the prisoner's dilemma game is repeated for T periods, and each …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012894288
Conditional cooperation is an important factor in voluntary cooperation. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) show that in public good games conditional cooperation among rational players is feasible if cooperators are sufficiently inequality averse and if there are not too many free riders. The derived...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012941202
candidates. -- social ranking ; fairness ; fair game forms ; objective equality ; mechanism ; design ; committee decision making …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008991294
In this paper we explore the relationship between an equitable distribution of the cost shares in public-good provision on the one hand and the core property of an allocation on the other. In particular we show that it is an inhomogeneous distribution of cost shares that motivates some coalition...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003983187
, strategic motives appear as a major drive for trustees, comparable in size to positive reciprocity, and more important than …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011734290
We introduce intention-based social preferences into a mechanism design framework with independent private values and quasilinear payoffs. For the case where the designer has no information about the intensity of social preferences, we provide conditions under which mechanisms which have been...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010354632
cooperation. We try to assess the relative importance of three motives - namely reciprocity, inequity aversion, and anchoring - in … a non-linear voluntary contribution experiment. We find that, for those conditionally cooperating, both reciprocity and … reciprocity. In contrast, anchoring plays only a marginal role. Compared to what previously found in linear voluntary contribution …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009313091
We experimentally compare two well-known mechanisms inducing the Shapley value as an ex ante equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: the demand-basedWinter's demand commitment bargaining mechanism and the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell procedure. Our results suggest that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013252966
We experimentally compare a simplified version of two mechanisms that implement the Shapley value as an (ex ante) equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: one proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996, H-MC) and the other by Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001, PC-W). While H-MC...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013252972
information on reciprocity types, implementability of an incentive-compatible social choice function is guaranteed if it satises … an additional insurance property. By contrast, precise information on reciprocity types may imply that all ecient social … agents have private information about their material payo types and their reciprocity types. We also provide a systematic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444226