Similar Search Results

Cooperative vs. non-cooperative truels : little agreement, but does that matter?

Bossert, Walter; Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001555893

Cooperative vs. non-cooperative truels : little agreement, but does that matter?

Bossert, Walter; Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001574701

Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter?

Bossert, Walter; Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc - In: Games and economic behavior 40 (2002) 2, pp. 185-202

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001696037

Biblical games : game theory and the Hebrew Bible

Brams, Steven J. - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001698000

Farsightedness in Games : Stabilizing Cooperation in International Conflicts

Brams, Steven J. - 2018

We show that a cooperative outcome—one that is at least next-best for the players—is not a Nash equilibrium (NE) in 19 of the 57 2 x 2 strict ordinal conflict games (33%), including Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken. Auspiciously, in 16 of these games (84%), cooperative outcomes are nonmyopic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012921117

Farsightedness in Games : Stabilizing Cooperation in International Conflict

Brams, Steven J.; Ismail, Mehmet - 2019

We show that a cooperative outcome — one that is at least next-best for the players — is not a Nash equilibrium (NE) in 19 of the 57 2 x 2 strict ordinal conflict games (33%), including Prisoners’ Dilemma and Chicken. Auspiciously, in 16 of these games (84%), cooperative outcomes are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014108979