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Valuable cheap talk and equilibrium selection

Jamison, Julian C. - 2012 - This version: January 11, 2012

Intuitively, we expect that players who are allowed to engage in costless communication before playing a game would be … foolish to agree on an inefficient equilibrium. At the same time, however, such preplay communication has been suggested as a … communication among players leads to a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the action game. Within the set of NE, efficiency then turns out to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009511713

Policy Gradient Methods Find the Nash Equilibrium in N-player General-sum Linear-quadratic Games

Hambly, Ben M.; Xu, Renyuan; Yang, Huining - 2021

We consider a general-sum N-player linear-quadratic game with stochastic dynamics over a finite horizon and prove the global convergence of the natural policy gradient method to the Nash equilibrium. In order to prove convergence of the method we require a certain amount of noise in the system....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013217478

Evolution and correlated equilibrium

Koch, Lars Peter (contributor) - 2008

We show that a set of outcomes outside the convex hull of Nash equilibria can be asymptotically stable with respect to convex monotonic evolutionary dynamics. Boundedly rational agents receive signals and condition the choice of strategies on the signals. A set of conditional strategies is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003782353

Equilibria existence in regular discontinuous games

Castro, Luciano I. de - 2008

Many conditions have been introduced to weaken the continuity re-quirements for equilibrium existence in games. We introduce a new con-dition, called regularity, that is simple and easy to verify. It is implied both by Reny's better-reply security and Simon and Zame's endogenous sharing rule...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003886176

Regret matching with finite memory

Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2010

We consider the regret matching process with finite memory. For general games in normal form, it is shown that any recurrent class of the dynamics must be such that the action profiles that appear in it constitute a closed set under the “same or better reply” correspondence (CUSOBR set) that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008688945

Ex-post regret learning in games with fixed and random matching : the case of private values

Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2010

In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to understand how to play games of incomplete information under private values. The conclusions depend on whether players interact within a fixed set (fixed matching) or they are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008688967

Strategic teaching and learning in games

Schipper, Burkhard - 2015

It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games that a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010516648

Preopening and equilibrium selection

Calcagno, Riccardo; Lovo, Stefano M. - 2010

We introduce a form of pre-play communication that we call preopening. During the preopening, players announce their …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380033

Slow and steady wins the race : approximating Nash equilibria in nonlinear quadratic tracking games

Blueschke, Dmitri; Blueschke-Nikolaeva, Victoria; … - 2015

We propose a meta-heuristic approach for solving nonlinear dynamic tracking games. In contrast to more "traditional" methods based on linear-quadratic (LQ) techniques, this derivative-free method is very flexible (e.g. to introduce inequality constraints). The meta-heuristic is applied to a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011298509

Alternating offers in economic environments

Houba, Harold - 2005

The Nash bargaining solution of a modified bargaining problem in the contract space yields the pair of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium proposals in the alternating offers model, also for positive time between proposals. As time vanishes, convergence to the Nash bargaining solution is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011343949

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