We propose a meta-heuristic approach for solving nonlinear dynamic tracking games. In contrast to more "traditional" methods based on linear-quadratic (LQ) techniques, this derivative-free method is very flexible (e.g. to introduce inequality constraints). The meta-heuristic is applied to a...

In this paper an algorithm is proposed to find an integral solution of (nonlinear) complementarity problems. The algorithm starts with a nonnegative integral point and generates a unique sequence of adjacent integral simplices of varying dimension. Conditions are stated under which the algorithm...

In this paper an algorithm is proposed to find an integral solution of (nonlinear) complementarity problems. The algorithm starts with a nonnegative integral point and generates a unique sequence of adjacent integral simplices of varying dimension. Conditions are stated under which the algorithm...

This paper provides an in-depth study of the (most) refined best reply correspondence introduced by Balkenborg, Hofbauer, and Kuzmics (2012). An example demonstrates that this correspondence can be very different from the standard best reply correspondence. In two-player games, however, the...

We present attractiveness, a refinement criterion for evolutionary equilibria. Equilibria surviving this criterion are robust to small perturbations of the underlying payoff system or the dynamics at hand. Furthermore, certain attractive equilibria are equivalent to others for certain...

We call a correspondence, defined on the set of mixed strategy profiles, a generalized best reply correspondence if it has (1) a product structure, is (2) upper semi-continuous, (3) always includes a best reply to any mixed strategy profile, and is (4) convex- and closed-valued. For each...

We show that in the canonical non-cooperative multilateral bargaining game, a subgame perfect equilibrium exists in pure stationary strategies, even when the space of feasible payoffs is not convex. At such an equilibrium there is no delay. We also have the converse result that randomization...

Fixed points of the (most) refined best reply correspondence, introduced in Balkenborg, Hofbauer, and Kuzmics (2013), in the agent normal form of extensive form games with perfect recall have a remarkable property. They induce fixed points of the same correspondence in the agent normal form of...

We call a correspondence, defined on the set of mixed strategy profiles, a generalized best reply correspondence if it has (1) a product structure, is (2) upper semi-continuous, (3) always includes a best reply to any mixed strategy profile, and is (4) convex- and closed-valued. For each...