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Market Structure and Matching with Contracts
Westkamp, Alexander - 2010
Ostrovsky [10] develops a theory of stability for a model of matching in exogenously given networks. For this model a … core stability of chain stable networks, (iii) the efficiency of chain stable networks, (iv) the existence of a group … with the core are also characterized. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003950989
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Decentralized Matching with Transfers : Noncooperative and Experimental Analyses
He, Simin - 2020
core and whether efficient matching is assortative determine the rate of matching, efficient matching, and surplus achieved …We conduct one of the first laboratory experiments and noncooperative analyses of the de-centralized matching market … but some differ from experimental evidence. Stable matching, which coincides with efficient matching in this setting, is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012834566
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The coalitional Nash bargaining solution with simultaneous payoff demands
Nieva, Ricardo - 2015
We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however, instead of alternating offers, we have simultaneous payoff demands. We focus in the producer game he studies. Each player is chosen with equal probability. If that is the case,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011296159
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The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution with Simultaneous Payoff Demands
Nieva, Ricardo - 2015
We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however, instead of alternating offers, we have simultaneous payoff demands. We focus in the producer game he studies. Each player is chosen with equal probability. If that is the case,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013019277
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Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003
Serrano, Roberto - 2005
This paper is a survey of the work in the Nash program for coalitional games, a research agenda proposed by Nash (1953) to bridge the gap between the non-cooperative and cooperative approaches to game theory
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014064861
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The paradox of new members in the EU Council of Ministers : a non-cooperative bargaining analysis
Montero, María - 2010 - This version: September 2010
Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may increase the power of an existing member, even if the number of votes of all existing members and the decision rule remain constant. This phenomenon is known as the paradox of new members. This paper uses the leading model of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008747121
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Networks with group counterproposals
Nieva, Ricardo - 2008
We study two n-player sequential network formation games with externalities. Link formation is tied to simultaneous transfer selection in a Nash demand like game in each period. Players in groups can counterpropose. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency in terms of cyclical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008780592
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The paradox of new members in the council of ministers : a noncooperative approach
Montero, María (contributor) - 2007
Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may increase the power of an existing member, even if the number of votes of all existing members and the decision rule remain constant. This phenomenon is known as the paradox of new members. This paper shows that the paradox has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003594384
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An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution
Trockel, Walter - 2009
This article provides an exact non-cooperative foundation of the sequential Raiffa solution for two person bargaining games. Based on an approximate foundation due to Myerson (1997) for any two-person bargaining game (S,d) an extensive form game G^S^d is defined that has an infinity of weakly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003944582
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The Paradox of New Members in the EU Council of Ministers : A Non-Cooperative Bargaining Analysis
Montero, Maria - 2010
Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may increase the power of an existing member, even if the number of votes of all existing members and the decision rule remain constant. This phenomenon is known as the paradox of new members. This paper uses the leading model of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013136169