We introduce intention-based social preferences into a mechanism design framework with independent private values and quasilinear payoffs. For the case where the designer has no information about the intensity of social preferences, we provide conditions under which mechanisms which have been...

We introduce intention-based social preferences into mechanism design. We explore information structures that dier with respect to what is commonly known about the weight that agents attach to reciprocal kindness. When the designer has no information on reciprocity types, implementability of an...

This paper describes a simple classroom activity that illustrates how economic theory can be used for mechanism design. The rules for a set of contests are presented; the results typically obtained from these contests illustrate how the prize structure can be manipulated in order to produce a...

We consider full-truthful Nash implementation, which requires that truth telling by each agent should be a Nash equilibrium of a direct revelation mechanism, and that the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism should coincide with the f-optimal outcome. We show that restricted...

Different evaluators typically disagree how to rank different candidates since they care more or less for the various qualities of the candidates. It is assumed that all evaluators submit vector bids assigning a monetary bid for each possible rank order. The rules must specify for all possible...

This paper considers mechanism design problems in environments with ambiguity-sensitive individuals. The novel idea of the paper is to introduce ambiguity in mechanisms so as to exploit the ambiguity sensitivity of individuals. We prove a revelation principle for the partial implementation of...

We say that a society has a weak norm against lying if, all other things being equal, agents rather lie in such a way that they do not get caught. We show that if this is the case then all incentive compatible social choice functions are Bayesian implementable, and furthermore, implementation...

This paper studies full implementation problems in (pure and mixed) Nash equilibrium in finite environments. We restrict the designer to adopt<I>finite</I> mechanisms, thus ruling out integer games. We provide a condition, top-<I>D</I> inclusiveness, that together with set-monotonicity is sufficient for mixed...</i></i>