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Ostrovsky [10] develops a theory of stability for a model of matching in exogenously given networks. For this model a … substitutability and cross side complementarity. Given this preference domain I analyze the interplay between properties of the network … stable network, and (v) the existence of an efficient and individually stable network. These equivalences also provide a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003950989
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008657634
This paper studies an evolutionary model of network formation with endogenous decay, in which agents benefit both from … determines the level of decay of each link. We address the issues of coordination (long-run equilibrium selection) and network …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009735339
This paper characterizes the set of equilibrium networks in the two-way flow model of network formation with small …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011382640
We prove that for generic network formation games where players incur some strictly positive cost to propose links the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014206986
We generalize the null player property (satisfied by the Shapley value) and nullifying player property (satisfied by the equal division solution) to the so-called delta-reducing player property, stating that a delta-reducing player (being a player such that any coalition containing this player...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014045005
Some new axiomatic characterizations and recursive formulas of the Shapley value are presented. In the results, dual games and the self-duality of the value implicitly play an important role. A set of non-cooperative games which implement the Shapley value on the class of all games is given
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014222309
One of the main issues in economics is the trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism. In the context of cooperative games this trade-off can be framed as one of choosing to allocate according to the Shapley value or the equal division solution. In this paper we provide tools that make it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014224553
This paper analyzes the stability of capital tax harmonization agreements in a stylized model where countries have formed coalitions which set a common tax rate in order to avoid the inefficient fully non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. In particular, for a given coalition structure we study to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013108831
This paper analyzes the stability of capital tax harmonization agreements in a stylized model where countries have formed coalitions which set a common tax rate in order to avoid the inefficient fully non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. In particular, for a given coalition structure we study to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009506562