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Self-enforcing collective counterterror retaliation

Oliveira, André L.; Silva, Emilson C. D. - In: Games 13 (2022) 1, pp. 1-16

Motivated by recent examples of collective effort on the war on terror, we examine the incentives that retaliation may produce for the endogenous formation of an international counterterror coalition. We show that there are quite reasonable circumstances under which any nation that is a target...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013171770

Terrorism and Counterterrorism : History Dependence, Spillovers and Coordination Failures

Faria, Joao Ricardo; Delfino Silva, Emilson; Arce, Daniel G. - 2013

This paper is the first systematic examination of (counter)terrorism dynamic games with two types of externalities …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014038216

"Look like the innocent flower, but be the serpent under't": mimicking behaviour of growth-oriented terrorist organizations

Hendel, Ulrich - 2012

on a two-period signaling game. The terrorists, taking into account the government's counter-terrorism response to first … choice it observes in period 1 and adjusts its second period counter-terrorism spending according to the perceived threat of … terrorism. Combining the signaling game and organizational growth approaches of previous contributions, this paper shows that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009656211

Individual versus overarching protection and attack of assets

Hausken, Kjell - In: Central European journal of operations research : CEJOR … 22 (2014) 1, pp. 89-112

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010231692

A tug of war team contest

Häfner, Samuel - 2015

This paper analyzes a tug of war contest between two teams. In each round of the tug of war a pair of agents from the opposing teams competes in a private value all-pay auction with asymmetric type distributions and effort effectiveness. Whichever team arrives first at a given lead in terms of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011569681