It has long been established in the literature that the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria of any binary game of strategic complements among a set N of players can be seen as a lattice on the set of all subsets of N under the partial order defined by the set inclusion relation (⊆). If the...

We adapt the method used by Jaynes to derive the equilibria of statistical physics to instead derive equilibria of bounded rational game theory. We analyze the dependence of these equilibria on the parameters of the underlying game, focusing on hysteresis effects. In particular, we show that by...

Swarnajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY) is a government-sponsored microfinance program. The scheme is based on four features: group lending with joint liability, progressive lending, back-ended subsidy, and social capital. We propose a new model of SGSY having these features: group lending...

It is not only the rule of a game that determines whether the game is cooperative or not in some instances. The historical strategies of the players in the game have a great effect on it also. Rational players will choose their strategies to make the game to be cooperative or non-cooperative,...

It has been proved in many studies that cheap talk has great influence on a players' choice of strategies. But the effect of cheap talk has still not been properly evaluated in game theory. Based on a novel game model with parameters denoting how one player cares for the other's payoff, we can...

In an important paper, Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) show that if players have an infinite depth of reasoning and this is commonly believed, types generically have a unique rationalizable action in games that satisfy a richness condition. We show that this result does not extend to environments...

We consider a general-sum N-player linear-quadratic game with stochastic dynamics over a finite horizon and prove the global convergence of the natural policy gradient method to the Nash equilibrium. In order to prove convergence of the method we require a certain amount of noise in the system....

Equivalence classes of normal form games are defined using the geometry of correspondences of standard equilibiurm concepts like correlated, Nash, and robust equilibrium or risk dominance and rationalizability. Resulting equivalence classes are fully characterized and compared across different...

Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may increase the power of an existing member, even if the number of votes of all existing members and the decision rule remain constant. This phenomenon is known as the paradox of new members. This paper uses the leading model of...

We study two n-player sequential network formation games with externalities. Link formation is tied to simultaneous transfer selection in a Nash demand like game in each period. Players in groups can counterpropose. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency in terms of cyclical...