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What explains significant variation across countries in the use of vote buying instead of campaign promises to secure voter support? This paper explicitly models the tradeoff parties face between engaging in vote buying and making campaign promises, and explores the distributional consequences...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011521218
We consider a model where policy motivated citizens vote in two simultaneous elections, one for the President who is elected by majority rule, in a single national district, and one for the Congressmen, each of whom is elected by majority rule in a local district. The policy to be implemented...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014180722
Social life offers innumerable instances in which trust relations involve multiple agents. In an experiment, we study a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011734290
conforming to Nash equilibrium behavior. We conduct an experiment on a minority-of-three game in which each player is a team … egocentric instead. Our results contribute to the understanding of coordination dynamics resting on heterogeneity and co …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011734522
conforming to Nash equilibrium behavior. We conduct an experiment on a minority-of-three game in which each player is a team … egocentric instead. Our results contribute to the understanding of coordination dynamics resting on heterogeneity and co … process level to the validity of modeling behavior using low-rationality reinforcement learning models. -- coordination …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009259730
conforming to Nash equilibrium behavior. We conduct an experiment on a minority-of-three game in which each player is a team … egocentric instead. Our results contribute to the understanding of coordination dynamics resting on heterogeneity and co …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014180445
We report experimental results on voluntary contributions to public-goods provision from situations in which parties can create institutions to impose a certain contribution level on its members. We focus on a public-goods game where the joint decisions inside the institution are made based on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771301
Many decisions taken in legislatures or committees are subject to lobbying efforts. A seminal contribution to the literature on vote-buying is the legislative lobbying model pioneered by Groseclose and Snyder (1996), which predicts that lobbies will optimally form supermajorities in many cases....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012035706
The paper presents experimental evidence on the impact of managers and their incentives on the behavior of group members in intergroup contests. I find that members follow the nonbinding investment recommendations of their group manager in particular if the managers payoff does not depend on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010340540
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011907910