Are individuals always better off when their preferences can be represented by expected utility?I study this question in a bargaining game where individuals bargain over a pie of fixed size, and I contrast the share received in the long-run by expected utility maximisers with the share they...

This paper proves that Lindahl has confused cost with benefit. He viewed public good as benefit and people will fight to take a larger share of the good. This paper proves that his model could not accommodate the public good, but the cost of the good. When a person has to take up the burden of...

Mechanisms which implement stable matchings are often observed to work well in practice, even in environments where the stable outcome is not unique, information is complete, and the number of players is small. Why might individuals refrain from strategic manipulation, even when the complexity...

In multi-object auction models with unitary demand agents, if agents utility functions satisfy quasi-linearity, three auction formats, sealed-bid auction, exact ascending auction, and approximate ascending auction, are known to identify the minimum price equilibrium (MPE), and exhibit elegant...

This chapter surveys a class of solution concepts for n -person games without transferable utility — NTU games for short — that are based on varying notions of “fair division”. An NTU game is a specification of payoffs attainable by members of each coalition through some joint course of...

This paper complements the existing literature on auditor-client negotiations by providing insights on the auditors' and clients' preferences for distributive negotiation strategies in an economic setting where negotiations may fail even if a common negotiation range exists. The analysis reveals...

We develop a theory of negotiation in which deals have multiple dimensions that can be bundled together. We use theory and experiments to show that in such settings efficient trade is possible even with substantial asymmetric information. The benefits of identifying areas of mutual gain guide...

We apply the aggregation property of Identical Shape Harmonic Absolute Risk Aversion (ISHARA) utility functions to analyze the comparative statics properties of a bargaining model with uncertainty. We identify sufficient and necessary conditions under which an increase in one's degree of risk...

The reference points negotiators use to evaluate outcomes have a dramatic influence over concession-making and agreements. However, the conventional finding that low reference points Induce more concessions and fewer impasses is limited to situations with deterministic payoffs. Indeed, the...

We consider one-to-one matching problems under two modalities of uncertainty that differ in the way types are assigned to agents. Individuals have preferences over the possible types of the agents from the opposite market side and initially know the "name" but not the "type" of the other...