This paper studies the conditions under which the basic results of the revealed preference theory can be established on the domain of choice problems which include non-convex feasible sets; the exercise is closely related to the works of Peters and Wakker (1991) and Bossert (1994). We show that...

This paper proves that bargaining can be equivalently depicted in a utility possibility curve, to derive the same unfair Nash solution. This paper confirms that there is no simple solution for bargaining, and that the so-called social indifference curve does not exist

We apply the aggregation property of Identical Shape Harmonic Absolute Risk Aversion (ISHARA) utility functions to analyze the comparative statics properties of a bargaining model with uncertainty. We identify sufficient and necessary conditions under which an increase in one's degree of risk...

Are individuals always better off when their preferences can be represented by expected utility?I study this question in a bargaining game where individuals bargain over a pie of fixed size, and I contrast the share received in the long-run by expected utility maximisers with the share they...

We extend the preference domain of the assignment problem to accommodate ordinal, cardinal and mixed preferences together and thereby allow the mechanism designer to elicit different levels of information about individuals' preferences. Given a fixed preference relation over a finite set of...

In multi-object auction models with unitary demand agents, if agents utility functions satisfy quasi-linearity, three auction formats, sealed-bid auction, exact ascending auction, and approximate ascending auction, are known to identify the minimum price equilibrium (MPE), and exhibit elegant...

This paper proves that Lindahl has confused cost with benefit. He viewed public good as benefit and people will fight to take a larger share of the good. This paper proves that his model could not accommodate the public good, but the cost of the good. When a person has to take up the burden of...

Mechanisms which implement stable matchings are often observed to work well in practice, even in environments where the stable outcome is not unique, information is complete, and the number of players is small. Why might individuals refrain from strategic manipulation, even when the complexity...

We reconsider the well known Becker-Coase (BC) argument, according to which changes in divorce laws should not affect divorce rates, in the context of households which consume public goods in addition to private goods. For this result to hold, utility must be transferable both within marriage...

This paper complements the existing literature on auditor-client negotiations by providing insights on the auditors' and clients' preferences for distributive negotiation strategies in an economic setting where negotiations may fail even if a common negotiation range exists. The analysis reveals...