In a world where firms are oligopolists, is it possible to create a customs union that raises the welfare of member countries without hurting non-members countries? We give sufficient conditions for an affirmative answer.

This note illustrates the fact that the number of active firms in free entry equilibrium may be largely indeterminate and different levels of positive profits may in many cases be sustained. This is shown to be true, in spite of market contestability, either under Cournot competition or under...

I apply three noncooperative models of coalition formation to a Cournot olygopoly. In each model, each firm has to choose the coalition it wants to belong to. But each of those models is characterised by a different assumption that defines what happens to a coalition from which one or more...

We consider a simple general equilibrium model with imperfect competition on the labor market. We show that on this market a rise in the number of trade unions may reduce the employment level. This result depends on the properties of the nominal wage-elasticity of the labor demand. It is...

This paper examines the stability of research joint venture when the success of innovative activities is uncertain. While an increase in the likelihood of making a discovery provides firms with an incentive to cooperate, there is a competing incentive to conduct R&D independently. Should the RJV...

A model of location choice by Cournot oligopolists is presented, under the assumption that R&D spillovers depend on the distance between firms. We show that a variety of patters emerge. Agglomeration is optimal under certain assumptions. Geographical dispersion in a two- dimensional plane is...

We analyze a model of lobbying by oligopolists who allocate entrepreneurial time between lobbying and internal control (monitoring). We seek answers to the following questions: (i) if firms differ woth recpect to comparative advantage in lobbying, what is the equilibrium allocation of time...

This paper studies the optimal production subsidies for domestic firms that compete in an export market against each other as well as against foreign rivals. Assuming that all firms do not have identical cost curves, it shows that the optimal policy for the home government is to give the more...

This paper examines underemployment fluctuations in an OG model with cournotian competition on the market for a good. In the case of constant returns, it demonstrates the existence conditions of a stable two-period cycle (in prices and employment amounts) in the backward perfect foresight...

We show that under Bertrand competition, firms may have an incentive to transfer real ressources to a joint venture operating in an unrelated market. The optimal transfers are typically asymmetric, in order to reduce the extent of rivalry in the oligopoly.