The subject of this study is an oligopolistic market in which three firms operate in an environment of quantitative competition known as the Cournot oligopoly model. Firms and their production are differentiated, which brings the theoretical model closer to real market conditions. The main...

In this paper we build a pragmatic model on competition in oligopoly markets. To achieve this goal, we use an approach based on studying the response functions of each market participant, thus making it possible to address both Cournot and Bertrand industrial structures with a unified formal...

In this paper we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a Cournot equilibrium when demand is rho-linear and firms are identical and produce under constant returns to scale. We focus on inelastic and convex demand which yields non concave profit functions.We show that...

It is shown that the equilibrium notion of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) does have predictive power for standard models of Bertrand competition. This is in contrast to a recent claim by Qin and Stuart (1997). The claim is based on the observation that the solution concept ESS behaves...

Introduction -- On the Works of Professor Koji Okuguchi -- Cournot, a Non-strategic Economist.-Cournot Tatonnement in Aggregative Games with Monotone Best Responses -- Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in Aggregative Games: an Expository Treatment -- On the Geometric Structure of the...

This paper reviews a framework for numerically analyzing dynamic interactions in imperfectly competitive industries. The framework dates back to Ericson and Pakes [1995. Review of Economic Studies 62, 53–82], but it is based on equilibrium notions that had been available for some time before,...