This paper examines the validity of alternative assumptions aboutpublic enterprise strategies in the presence of both domestic and internationalcompetition. It extends the quantity-setting game to apreplay stage and endogenizes the firms’ order of moves to show thati) Cournot competition is...

We examine the strategic behavior of leaders and followers in sequential duopoly experiments in which followers either perfectly observe the leaders' actions or else observe nothing. (...)

We analyze a Bayesian merger game under two-sided asymmetric information about firm types. We show that the standard prediction of the lemons market model-if any, only low-type firms are traded-is likely to be misleading: Merger returns, i.e. the difference between pre- and post-merger profits,...

Recent literature shows that learning in oligopoly games might in the long run result in the Cournot or in the Walras equilibrium. Which outcome is achieved seems to depend on the underlying learning dynamics. This paper analyzes the forces behind the learning mechanisms determining the long run...

This note provides sufficient conditions for immediate agreement in an extensive form model of interdependent bilateral bargaining. The model is suggested by Björnerstedt and Stennek (2006) as a work horse for studying bilateral oligopoly. The key feature of this model is that the firms are...

Forward sales is a credible commitment to aggressive spot market bidding, and it mitigates producers' market power in electricity markets. Still it can be profitable for a producer to make such a commitment if it results in a soft response from competitors in the spot market (strategies are...

The supply function equilibrium provides a game-theoretic model of strategic bidding in oligopolistic wholesale electricity auctions. This paper presents an intuitive account of current understanding and shows how welfare losses depend on the number of firms in the market and their asymmetry....

The aim of this work is to establish a mathematically precise framework for studying games of capital accumulation under uncertainty. Such games arise as a natural extension from different perspectives that all lead to singular control exercised by the agents, which induces some essential...