We introduce a model of oligopoly dynamic pricing where firms with limited capacity face a sales deadline. We establish conditions under which the equilibrium is unique and converges to a system of differential equations. Using unique and comprehensive pricing and bookings data for competing...

Changes in the extent of multi-market contact (MMC) between firms often affect market outcomes – quantities and prices. We show that a strategic but purely competitive effect of changes in MMC can change the quantity provided in a market by a firm by as much as 50%, and the prices a firm sets...

We explore how pricing dynamics in the European airline industry vary with the competitive environment. Our results highlight substantial variations in pricing dynamics that are consistent with a theory of intertemporal price discrimination. First, the rate at which prices increase towards the...

We introduce a model of oligopoly dynamic pricing where firms with limited capacity face a sales deadline. We establish conditions under which the equilibrium is unique and converges to a system of differential equations. Using unique and comprehensive pricing and bookings data for competing...

This paper develops a model of airline competition. The model is based on a demand and pricing equation system, which is estimated for the Spanish airline market. The empirical implementation of the equation system relies on a simultaneous rather than a consecutive procedure. I test the...

We explore how pricing dynamics in the European airline industry vary with competition and document patterns that are consistent with intertemporal price discrimination. First, the rate at which prices increase over time decreases in competition, supporting the idea that competition restrains...

This paper analyzes persuasive advertising and pricing in oligopoly if firms sell differentiated products and consumers have heterogeneous social attitudes towards the consumption by others. Deriving product demand from primitives, we show that the demand-enhancing effect of persuasive...

Firms signal high quality through high prices even if the market structure is highly competitive and price competition is severe. In a symmetric Bertrand oligopoly where products may differ only in their quality, production cost is increasing in quality and the quality of each firm’s product...

We consider an oligopolistic market where firms compete in price and quality and where consumers are heterogeneous in knowledge: some consumers know both the prices and quality of the products offered, some know only the prices and some know neither. We show that two types of signalling...

We consider an oligopolistic market where firms compete in price and quality and where consumers have heterogeneous information: some consumers know both the prices, and quality of the products offered, some know only the prices, and some know neither. We show that if there are sufficiently many...