discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this outcome. We extend these results to the case … number of steps, maximal collusion is attained with simple price-quantity strategies exhibiting capacity withholding. …This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price …

capacity constrained producers. …

Consider a market where producers submit supply functions to a procurement auction - e.g. an electric power auction … reservation price, and (iiii) capacity constraints that bind with a positive probability, there is a unique symmetric SFE. …

This paper characterizes the Nash equilibrium in a pay-as-bid (discriminatory), divisible-good, procurement auction …’s demand exceeds suppliers’ capacity with a positive probability. The derived equilibrium can be used to model strategic …-ups of the derived equilibrium are compared to results for the SFE of a uniform-price auction …

-good/multi-unit auctions provides guidance on the design of the auction format, setting the reservation price, the rationing rule, and …

/multi-unit auctions provides guidance on the design of the auction format, setting the reservation price, the rationing rule, and …

reduce or at best cancel sanctions for price-fixing firms that self-report -- may make collusion enforceable even in one …-shot competitive interactions, like Bertrand oligopolies and first-price auctions, where no collusion would be supportable otherwise …

is highest if only the competitor(s) is (are) loyal to the cartel. Yet collusion inflicts harm on the opposite market … we add beliefs as a control variable, we only find that externalities enhance cooperation, even if gains from collusion …

risk of collusion in the product market if products are substitutes, if capacity cannot immediately be extended, if market … clearing an R&D agreement can be beneficial since it removes the additional collusion incentive resulting from fear that …