We construct a model where incumbents can either acquire basic innovations from entrepreneurs, or wait and acquire developed innovations from entrepreneurial firms supported by venture capitalists. We show that venture-backed entrepreneurial firms have an incentive to overinvest in development...

Private equity owned firms have more leverage, more intense compensation contracts, and higher productivity than comparable firms. We develop a theory of buyouts in oligopolistic markets that explains these facts. Private equity firms are more aggressive in inducing restructuring compared to...

We provide a model of dynamic duopoly in which firms face financial constraints and disappear when they are unable to fulfill them. We show that, in some cases, Cournot outputs are no longer supported in equilibrium, because if these outputs were set, a firm may have incentives to ruin the...

We develop an oligopoly model in which firms facing unionised domestic labor markets choose between producing an intermediate good in-house and outsourcing it to a nonunionised foreign supplier that makes a relationship-specific investment in developing the intermediate. The paper sheds light on...

A robust result in the literature on strategic incentives pioneered by Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987), and Vickers (1985) is that under quantity competition firm owners induce their managers to make aggressive quantity choices in the product market. We revisit this result in a...

We model a dynamic duopoly in which firms can potentially drive their rivals from the market. A consequence is that, for some ranges of parameters, the static Cournot equilibrium outcome cannot be sustained in an infinitely repeated setting. In those cases, there is a Markov perfect equilibrium...

When and how do entrepreneurs sell their inventions? To address this issue, we develop an endogenous entry-sale asymmetric information oligopoly model. We show that lowquality inventions are sold directly or used for entry. Inventors who sell post-entry use entry to credibly reveal information...

Strategic interactions between two-sided platforms depend not only on whether their decision variables are strategic complements or substitutes as for one-sided firms, but also - and crucially so - on whether or not the platforms subsidize one side of the market in equilibrium. For example, with...

When and how do entrepreneurs sell their inventions? To address this issue, we develop an endogenous entry-sale asymmetric information oligopoly model. We show that lowquality inventions are sold directly or used for own entry. Inventors who sell post-entry use entry to credibly reveal...

The monopolistic competition model is suitable for markets with a large group of relatively small firms. However, it hardly describes oligopoly markets where several multi-national companies dominate the markets and each giant firm produces a large number of products. Such a market structure...