We develop a macroeconomic framework in which firms are large and have market power with respect to both products and labor. Each firm maximizes a share-weighted average of shareholder utilities, which makes the equilibrium independent of price normalization. In a one-sector economy, if returns...

We develop a macroeconomic framework in which firms are large and have market power with respect to both products and labor. Each firm maximizes a share-weighted average of shareholder utilities, which makes the equilibrium independent of price normalization. In a one-sector economy, if returns...

In this paper, we study the effects of common ownership, the extent to which firms are linked via common owners, on employee earnings in U.S. local labor markets. Between 1999 and 2017, common ownership in local labor markets has more than doubled. Panel regressions show that employee earnings...

We develop a macroeconomic framework in which firms are large and have market power with respect to both products and labor. Each firm maximizes a share-weighted average of shareholder utilities, which makes the equilibrium independent of price normalization. In a one-sector economy, if returns...

We develop a tractable general equilibrium framework in which firms are large and have market power, with respect to both products and labor, and in which a firm's decisions are affected by its ownership structure. We characterize the Cournot--Walras equilibrium of an economy where each firm...

This paper recovers and extends unpublished results from the oligopoly with the shareholder voting model of Azar (2012). In particular, we generalize the model to allow for managerial entrenchment. The general model nests the worldviews of both the proponents and skeptics of the common ownership...

We develop an empirical model of overlapping ownership conduct. The model (i) links firm conduct parameters to deep parameters of the firm's process of shareholder preference aggregation through voting; (ii) can cope with ownership settings involving both intra- and inter-industry overlapping...