This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price … which the monopoly outcome with equal sharing is sustainable in the uniform price auction, but not in the corresponding … discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this outcome. We extend these results to the case …

price auction. There are at least three potential bidders in the market which differ in their willingness to pay for the … auction and obtains the license. In stage 2, it purchases inputs required for producing the particular service which is then …

reduce or at best cancel sanctions for price-fixing firms that self-report -- may make collusion enforceable even in one …-shot competitive interactions, like Bertrand oligopolies and first-price auctions, where no collusion would be supportable otherwise …

or at best cancel sanctions for price-fixing firms that self-report -- may make collusion enforceable even in one …-shot competitive interactions, like Bertrand oligopolies and first-price auctions, where no collusion would be supportable otherwise …

Consider a market where producers submit supply functions to a procurement auction - e.g. an electric power auction …