This paper considers a three-stage game of a differentiated oligopoly: firms first make their entry decisions, then they choose production technologies and in the third stage of the game they decide product prices. The technology choice can be understood as selecting a technology from a pool of...

This paper considers the situation where some firms in an industry collude together as an RJV cartel to compete with other firms who individually engage in R&D. The analysis shows that this partial RJV cartelisation may increase market concentration. In comparison with pure R&D competition,...

This paper considers a three-stage game of a differentiated oligopoly: firms first make their entry decisions, then they choose production technologies and in the third stage of the game they decide product prices. The technology choice can be understood as selecting a technology from a pool of...

Within a framework of differentiated oligopolies, this paper studies how the tax incentive of a developing country on foreign direct investment (FDI) affects the structure of a specific domestic industry. Benefits from the tax incentive are analysed based upon the effects of the tax reduction on...

Within a framework of differentiated oligopolies, this paper studies how the tax incentive of a developing country on foreign direct investment (FDI) affects the structure of a specific domestic industry. Benefits from the tax incentive are analysed based upon the effects of the tax reduction on...

This paper considers the situation where some firms in an industry collude together as an RJV cartel to compete with other firms who individually engage in R&D. The analysis shows that this partial RJV cartelisation may increase market concentration. In comparison with pure R&D competition,...