This thesis addresses a problem at the nexus of operations, strategy, and economics: in concentrated markets, on the one hand firms may need to expand capacity in order to improve their competitive position, and on the other they also seek to avoid industry excess capacity causing poor industry...

The aim of this work is to establish a mathematically precise framework for studying games of capital accumulation under uncertainty. Such games arise as a natural extension from different perspectives that all lead to singular control exercised by the agents, which induces some essential...

Forward sales is a credible commitment to aggressive spot market bidding, and it mitigates producers' market power in electricity markets. Still it can be profitable for a producer to make such a commitment if it results in a soft response from competitors in the spot market (strategies are...

This paper investigates why subjects in laboratory experiments on quantity precommitment games consistently choose capacities above the Cournot level - the subgame-perfect equilibrium. We argue that this puzzling regularity may be attributed to players' perceptions of their opponents' skill or...