. -- cartels ; collusion ; communication ; experiments ; repeated games …We explore the difference between explicit and tacit collusion by investigating the impact communication has in … largest additional profit from talking. We also find that industries continue to collude successfully after communication is …

We explore the difference between explicit and tacit collusion by investigating the impact communication has in … largest additional profit from talking. We also find that industries continue to collude successfully after communication is … disabled. Communication supports firms in coordinating on collusive pricing schemes, and it is also used for conflict mediation …

on firms' price setting behavior in a 2x2 factorial design experiment with and without communication and under present … which correlate with market outcomes and communication's effectiveness. The results have implications for antitrust policy …

to form cartels in Cournot markets. As in previous experiments, markets become very competitive when individualized … information is available and participants cannot communicate. In contrast, when communication is possible, results reverse …: Markets become less competitive and cartels become more stable when individualized information is available. We also observe …

We study the role of communication in collusive market sharing. In a series of Cournot oligopoly experiments with …. We find that the effect of communication on the firms' ability to collude depends on the type of information available … strategy, even if stated only once, drives this strong effect. Our results point to the types and contents of communication …

guarantee fewer cartels in a market. (ii) Cartel formation occurs in two distinct ways. In one case, firms simultaneously choose …) Managers are more likely to form cartels when managers' and owners' incentives are different compared to when their incentives …