In an evolutionary delegation game, we investigate the effects on market outputs of different levels of information about the way managers are compensated. When managers are informed about their opponents, the long -- run configuration of the industry depends on market conditions. When managers...

In this paper, we analyze the properties of evolutionary switching models for oligopoly games, where boundedly rational agents can follow different behavioral rules (or heuristics) to update their production decisions through repeated adaptive rules. In particular, we focus on well known...

In this paper, we propose an evolutionary oligopoly game of technology adoption in a market with isoelastic demand and two possible (linear) production technologies. While one technology is characterized by lower marginal costs, the magnitude of fixed costs entails that a technology does not...

One objective of this chapter is to provide the reader with a clear and intuitive, but yet rigorous, description of the topic of strategic managerial incentives under oligopolistic competition. We further discuss the closely related issues of vertical separation where a manufacturer delegates...