shocks. A conventional Mirrleesian treatment is shown to provoke manipulations of the policy mechanism by individuals with …

priori unknown. The analysis is based on a mechanism design approach that imposes a requirement of robustness with respect to … ; public goods provision ; revelation of preferences ; robust mechanism design …

public goods preferences. A mechanism design approach is used to establish the following result: If policies are required to …

preferences for public goods. A mechanism design approach is used to characterize implementable tax and expenditure policies. A … ; Public goods provision ; Revelation of Preferences ; Robust Mechanism Design …

preferences is made available. We first study this problem from a general mechanism design perspective and show that efficiency is … system. We then study democratic mechanisms with the property that tax payers vote over public goods. Under such a mechanism …

priori unknown. The analysis is based on a mechanism design approach that imposes a requirement of robustness with respect to …

public goods preferences. A mechanism design approach is used to establish the following result: If policies are required to …

preferences for public goods. A mechanism design approach is used to characterize implementable tax and expenditure policies. A …

preferences is made available. We first study this problem from a general mechanism design perspective and show that efficiency is … system. We then study democratic mechanisms with the property that tax payers vote over public goods. Under such a mechanism …

public goods preferences. A mechanism design approach is used to establish the following result: If policies are required to …