We characterize an optimal redistributive pension scheme when individuals face temptation, but can exert costly self-control (as in Gul & Pesendorfer, 2001; 2004). Our results challenge the common wisdom that forced savings tend to reduce individuals' mental cost of self-control. In our model,...

We examine how the introduction of self-control preferences influences the trade-off between two fundamental components of a public pension system: the contribution rate and its degree of redistribution. The pension regime affects individuals' welfare by altering how yielding to temptation (i.e....

We examine how the introduction of self-control preferences influences the trade-off between two fundamental components of a public pension system: the contribution rate and its degree of redistribution. The pension regime affects individuals' welfare by altering how yielding to temptation (i.e....

We study optimal income and commodity tax policy with credit-constrained low-income households. Workers are assumed to receive an even ow of income during the tax year, but make tax payments or receive transfers at the end of the year. They use their disposable income to purchase multiple...

We study optimal income and commodity tax policy with credit-constrained low-income households. Workers are assumed to receive an even ow of income during the tax year, but make tax payments or receive transfers at the end of the year. They use their disposable income to purchase multiple...