We develop a partial equilibrium, perfectly competitive framework of a (potentially) vertically oriented industry. There are three types of firms: Upstream firms that use primary factors to produce an intermediate; downstream firms that use primary factors and intermediates to produce a final...

To explain organizational decisions in multistage production processes we assume a production process with one producer and two suppliers of which one is the firm's direct supplier and the other one is the supplier of the supplier. The firm decides only on the organizational form of her direct...

Which firms find it optimal to integrate their input suppliers into the firm boundaries of control (vertical integration)? Which firms choose to expand their sourcing activities across the national border (offshoring)? This letter provides novel evidence on these questions based on a Spanish...

We explore the incentives of a vertically integrated incumbent firm to license the production technology of its core input to an external firm, transforming the licensee into its input supplier. We find that the incumbent opts for licensing even when licensing also transforms the licensee into...

The costs of vertical integration are analyzed within a game-theoretic signaling model. It is shown that a company when being vertically integrated with a supplier may well decide to buy certain components from this supplier even at a lower quality than that offered by external sources. When the...