In this paper we contribute to the literature on the structure of interlocking directorship networks and to the literature on the relationship between corporate governance and performance. We use a unique dataset made of corporate governance variables related to the board size and interlocking...

Previous research on firm performance does not adequately account for the interrelatedness of a firm's professional connections, political ties, and family business-group affiliation. Many widely-cited findings may therefore be subject to confounding bias. To address this problem, we adopt a...

The recent systemic crisis that has affected the financial markets and real economies of major industrialized countries has had significant effects on the corporate governance and key organizational choices of large firms. In this context, the present study aims to verify whether the...

In this contribution, at first, we introduce a basic network framework to study pyramidal structures and wedges between ownership and control of companies. Then, we apply it to a dataset of 53.5 million of companies operating in 208 countries. Among others, we detect a strong concentration of...

When public institutions do not support information disclosure and contract enforcement, controlling owners may compensate by setting up ownership networks that facilitate the exchange of resources and alignment of interests. We examine how firms' controlling owners draw power from ownership...

In his article, Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing Countries: Anchoring Relational Exchange, Professor Ronald Gilson raises critical points against the conventional view of corporate governance in a controlling shareholder regime with poor investor protection: (1) given that equity...

Previous studies have shown that product market competition has an important effect on corporate strategies and internal governance mechanisms. Using a sample of China’s listed firms from 2004 to 2009, we explore the relationship between product market competition and normal related party...

Equity ties between businesses change the division of the firms joint profits, thereby affecting incentives for relation-specific investments and other strategic actions. Depending on which side owns the equity and how readily the equity can be resold, we find that the changed incentives can...

I study the board structure of a sample of dual-class firms from 1998 to 2002. Using a sample of single-class firms as control, I evaluate the average treatment effect of dual-class ownership on board structure. I conduct the program evaluation through a switching regime model based on selection...

This paper examines the composition of supervisory boards of German banks for a sample of 41 large banks in the period 1999-2006. We find that the supervisory board structure reflects both outside control by shareholders and inside control by stakeholders. Most of the non-employee board members...