This paper analyzes how ownership concentration and managerial incentives influences bank risk for a large sample of US banks over the period 1997-2007. Using 2SLS simultaneous equations models, we show that ownership concentration has a positive total effect on bank risk. This is the result of...

Accounting research on choices of inventory valuation methods has focused on various consequences of two extreme methods: LIFO and FIFO. The main consequence studies relate to effects of the differences in taxes payable between the two methods on security prices. However, tax consequences appear...

Firms routinely justify CEO compensation by benchmarking against companies with highly paid CEOs. We examine whether the 2006 regulatory requirement of disclosing compensation peers mitigated firms' opportunistic peer selection activities. We find that strategic peer benchmarking did not...

Firms regularly justify their CEOs' compensation by referencing companies with highly paid CEOs with whom they claim to compete for managerial talent. This paper examines whether the 2006 regulatory requirement of disclosing compensation peers has mitigated firms' opportunistic peer benchmarking...

This study examines the determinants of CEO compensation using data from a nationally representative sample of privately held U.S. corporations. We find that (i) the pay-size elasticity is much larger for privately held firms than for the publicly traded firms on which previous research has...

Previous literature shows that employee ownership can be used as a reward management tool or as entrenchment mechanism. This paper develop a model suggesting that employee ownership policy reveals management quality. Good managers would use employee ownership as a reward management tool whereas...

Employee ownership is often used as a reward management tool but also as entrenchment mechanism. This paper develops a model suggesting that employee ownership policy reveals management quality. Good managers would use employee ownership as a reward management tool whereas bad managers would...

Purpose: This study explores the probability of expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders in the form of CEO compensation under an imperfect governance institution by using a novel Chinese dataset over 2001-2010.Design/methodology/approach: We use a direct method to...

Using the most recent data available, I examine the influence of large shareholders and institutional investors on different components of CEO compensation. Increased large shareholder ownership reduces total pay and current elements of incentive compensation, i.e. option, stock, and bonus pay,...

We find that the presence of independent directors who are blockholders (IDBs) in firms promotes better CEO contracting and monitoring, and higher firm valuation. Using a panel of about 11,500 firm-years with a unique, hand-collected dataset on IDB-identity and a novel instrument, we find that...