Most pre-crisis explanations of the various corporate governance systems have considered the separation between ownership and control to be an advantage of the Anglo-American economies. They have also attributed the failure of other countries to achieve these efficient arrangements to their...

Using ownership and control data for 890 firm-years, this paper examines the concentration of capital and voting rights in British companies in the second half of the nineteenth century. We find that both capital and voting rights were diffuse by modern-day standards. This implies that ownership...

Using ownership and control data for 890 firm-years, this paper examines the concentration of capital and voting rights in British companies in the second half of the nineteenth century. We find that both capital and voting rights were diffuse by modern-day standards. This implies that ownership...

This paper examines the origins of investor protection under the common law by analysing the development of shareholder protection in Victorian Britain, the home of the common law. In this era, very little was codified, with corporate law simply suggesting a default template of rules....

This paper examines the origins of investor protection under the common law by analysing the development of shareholder protection in Victorian Britain, the home of the common law. In this era, very little was codified, with corporate law simply suggesting a default template of rules....

Vital in preserving managerial accountability, the firmly established one share, one vote rule provides shareholders with limited rights to elect directors who appoint managers and to approve certain extraordinary transactions. Without the deterrents of risk of capital loss and fear of removal,...

This paper analyses the German corporate law reform's effect on the publicly listed companies' ownership and performance. First, theoretically plausible implications of the most important laws that were issued 1990-2009 are provided, then an empirical analysis using 1997-2008 panel data...

I show that private equity transactions (i) illustrate market-driven reactions to inefficient equity markets that result from the diffusion of equity ownership in the public firm and (ii) form part of a larger market trend to-wards the market oriented blockholder model – a hybrid ownership...

Investor confidence in financial markets depends in large part on the existence of an accurate disclosure and reporting regime that provides transparency in the beneficial ownership and control structures of publicly listed companies. Today, a common post-financial crisis regulatory reform theme...

Using a sample of voting turnouts of annual general meetings of European companies, we document that shareholder voting turnouts are significantly different according to the ownership structure of the company. Different types of shareholder classes show different voting engagements according to...