This paper aims to provide empirical evidence on the effects of CEO's share option remuneration and CEO's stock ownership on leasing. Financial contracting theory suggests that ownership structure is important determinant of capital structure, debt financing and leasing. Also, lease financing is...

We analyze how ownership concentration and type, and board independence are related to corporate social performance (CSP). Drawing from agency, team production and stakeholder perspectives, we argue that the distribution of costs and benefits to shareholders and other stakeholders is crucial to...

This paper empirically examines the relation between corporate risk-taking and the organizational level with which internal auditing is affiliated in Chinese listed firms. Using a sample of 1,806 firm-year data available from 2007 to 2009, we find that Chinese corporate risk-taking is only...

We focus on firms that chronically underperform and evaluate ways that institutional investors can facilitate the redeployment of assets to higher valued uses. Our evidence indicates that institutional holdings affect firm survival. Increases in institutional holdings are associated with...

We study the relationship between the acquisition of partial equity ownership and interlocking directorates among rival companies. Partial equity ownership between rivals in the product market is convenient, even in the case of passive participation, since, internalizing competition, raises the...

This paper seeks to understand the extent financialisation has had an impact on the rental housing market in Berlin. Specifically, it focuses on the financialisation of non-financial rental housing companies. The financial statements of five large, publicly listed, commercial rental housing...

Previous studies provide evidence of a negative relationship between staggered boards and firm value. However, these studies use specifications that do not allow for the heterogeneous impacts of staggered boards for different subsets of firms as predicted by theory. This paper presents more...

We compare the change in ownership concentration in firms privatized through two different programs of mass privatization: the Czech voucher scheme and the Polish program of National Investment Funds. Despite important differences in ownership structure at the start of the process and in the...

We compare the change in ownership concentration in firms privatized through two different programs of mass privatization: the Czech voucher scheme and the Polish program of National Investment Funds. Despite important differences in ownership structure at the start of the process and in the...

This paper uses network theory to argue that the consequences of horizontal ownership by large investment institutions are more complicated than, and sometimes completely the opposite of, what conventional economic theory predicts. Horizontal ownership occurs when a large investment institution,...