Showing 1 - 10 of 3,894
This paper examines the determinants of executive compensation in Chinese banking during 2005-2012. Using the fixed effects panel, 2SLS and dynamic GMM regressions, I find that there is no significant positive pay performance relation, and CEO power does not necessarily exhibit higher levels of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013024202
The negative effects of common ownership on competition have received significant attention, but many proposed mechanisms for institutional investor influence seem implausible. We develop and test an analytical model of optimal compensation in an oligopoly with common ownership, focusing on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324403
We study the managers' compensation schemes adopted by publicly listed family firms by means of a theoretical model and … typically exhibit lower expected pay but higher pay-for-performance sensitivity than external managers, despite their large …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012866080
This paper studies how managerial compensation is shaped by the risk preference of shareholders. Firms with a large ownership held by "dual holders'' -- institutional investors that simultaneously hold equity and bonds of the company -- choose a less risk-inducing compensation structure....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012848455
This paper examines the reliance on ESG metrics in executive compensation contracts. In our sample of international publicly traded firms, a rapidly growing fraction incorporate ESG metrics in the compensation schemes of their top executives. Our analysis links the reliance on these metrics to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013435292
. This paper develop a model suggesting that employee ownership policy reveals management quality. Good managers would use … employee ownership as a reward management tool whereas bad managers would implement it for entrenchment motives. We bring about … three main conclusions: (i) Bad managers use employee ownership as an entrenchment mechanism. (ii) This latter phenomenon …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013128653
model suggesting that employee ownership policy reveals management quality. Good managers would use employee ownership as a … reward management tool whereas bad managers would implement it for entrenchment motives. We bring about three main … conclusions: (i) Bad managers use employee ownership as an entrenchment mechanism. (ii) This latter phenomenon increases the cost …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013125539
We document a significantly positive relationship between executive compensation and risk-taking of Chinese listed banks over the 2007–2018 period. The finding is robust to the risk measures (Z-score, systematic risk and stock return volatility) used, the way to calculate executive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012834812
In response to corporate governance concerns, SEC disclosure rules, and encouragement by Institutional Shareholder Services, most large U.S. public firms have adopted executive stock ownership requirements in recent years. Compared to CEOs already in compliance, CEOs who have not yet fulfilled...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012937282
We consider a model of CEO selection, dismissal and retention. Firms with larger blockholder ownership monitor more; they get more information about CEO ability, which facilitates the dismissal of low-ability CEOs. These firms are matched with CEOs whose ability is more uncertain. For retention...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012975704