We analyze the effect of two types of corporate diversification (business diversification and ownership diversification) on the market value of the Chilean firms. For a sample of 83 nonfinancial firms listed on the Santiago Stock Market from 2005 to 2013, we find a discount for both business and...

In this paper, we analyze what effects separating ownership and control have on the performance of a sample of 99 Chilean family-controlled firms for the period 2001–2014. Our results show an inverse U-shaped relationship between voting rights and cash flow rights divergence and firm value....

This article examines the effects of family control and pyramidal ownership on firms’ capital structure decisions. After studying a sample of listed family and nonfamily firms in Chile, we find that families take a conservative approach to debt and financial risk exposure. We test the...

This paper examines the relation between firm investment ratios and institutional blockholder ownership for a sample of 6,300 publicly traded firms of 16 large emerging markets for the 2005-2014 period. Results show that independent, long-term, and local institutional investors boost investment...

Blockholders presence is a common attribute of modern corporations around the world. This work studies the effect of the presence of multiple blockholder in firm valuation for a sample of Latin American firms. To this effect, several measures of control contestability were constructed. Using OLS...

This article examines the effects of family involvement on dividend policy in closely held firms that face agency problems involving majority-minority shareholders. We argue that minority shareholders press for dividends when they perceive situations fostering wealth expropriation. Looking at...

This paper studies the separation of ownership and control for an average of 140 listed non-financial corporations in Colombia during the 1996-2002 period. Breaking down the sample according to corporations` listing status and economic activity shows that voting rights are greater than cash flow...