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Using a comprehensive international sample of 18,932 firms across 40 countries, we find that cross-country variations in ownership concentration are attributable to differences in firm sizes. Ownership concentration in large firms differs strikingly between countries. For example, large U.S....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012840374
We investigate the governance sensitivity of foreign institutional investors’ (FII) ownership in a large emerging market setting of India, characterized by highly concentrated insider ownership. More specifically, we focus on the moderating role of firm size and price to book value (PB) in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014257561
We investigate the governance sensitivity of foreign institutional investors' (FII) ownership in a large emerging market setting of India, characterized by highly concentrated insider ownership. More specifically, we focus on the moderating role of firm size and price to book value (PB) in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012219254
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003805335
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010196339
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001333934
mergers and acquisitions. In this paper we show that a knowledge-based firm's probability of being a takeover target is … manager owner significantly decreases that firm's probability of being a takeover target. -- ownership structure ; property …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003931309
more passive shareholders (lower ownership per non-institutional shareholder) are less likely to be takeover targets, less … likely to be acquired and command higher premiums. Using the adoption of anti-takeover law in Delaware as an exogenous shock … to anti-takeover protection, we show that the passiveness of shareholder base decreases as the takeover threat subsides …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009009605
We analyze the dynamics of takeover contests where hostile raiders compete against white knights involved by a lead … to set a minimum takeover price. We characterize the conditions under which a white knight wins the takeover contest … white knights as an anti-takeover device and the role played by leading minority blockholders in the market for corporate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377390
We allow the preference of a political majority to determine boththe corporate governance structure and the division of profits betweenhuman and financial capital. In a democratic society where financialwealth is concentrated, a political majority may prefer to restraingovernance by dispersed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011337975