We explore the effect of institutional directors on Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay (total, fixed, and variable compensation). We delve particularly into the impact of pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant institutional directors, who, respectively, represent institutional investors who...

Previous literature shows that employee ownership can be used as a reward management tool or as entrenchment mechanism. This paper develop a model suggesting that employee ownership policy reveals management quality. Good managers would use employee ownership as a reward management tool whereas...

Employee ownership is often used as a reward management tool but also as entrenchment mechanism. This paper develops a model suggesting that employee ownership policy reveals management quality. Good managers would use employee ownership as a reward management tool whereas bad managers would...

We investigate whether management quality explains firm performance in Russia. We find that it explains relatively little in terms of firm performance, but it does explain some of the differences between firms in Russia's Far East and the rest of Russia. Firms that have always been in private...

Agency theory emphasizes that separating ownership and control can lead to inefficiencies in corporations, but the literature on strategic delegation points out that the owner will profit from this separation due to advantages from self-commitment. In this paper, both literatures are combined....

Previous research on firm performance does not adequately account for the interrelatedness of a firm's professional connections, political ties, and family business-group affiliation. Many widely-cited findings may therefore be subject to confounding bias. To address this problem, we adopt a...