We allow the preference of a political majority to determine boththe corporate governance structure and the division of profits betweenhuman and financial capital. In a democratic society where financialwealth is concentrated, a political majority may prefer to restraingovernance by dispersed...

In this paper we present the first evidence for a link between foreign ownership and credit constraints for Germany, one of the world's leading target countries for foreign direct investment. Furthermore, we contribute to the literature by investigating the impact of a foreign acquisition on the...

With this paper we present the first microeconometric analysis of the impact of a foreign acquisition on the target firms' access to finance. By using a large database of German firms we furthermore investigate for the first time the link between foreign ownership and access to finance in...

We examine shareholder monitoring in the context of executive pay–carbon performance sensitivity among U.S. firms. While corporates are under pressure to curb their greenhouse gas emissions, still little is known about the incentive structures for managers in this context. We document that a...

This paper provides novel evidence on how green shareholder pressure can propagate emission spillover to asset owners who are subject to fewer oversights. Using shareholder proposals, engagement, and activism campaigns, I find publicly listed energy firms divest pollutive assets and lead to an...

Monitoring by institutional investors can act as an important mechanism to promote firm innovation. By investigating Chinese listed firms' patenting between 2002 and 2011, we find that the presence of institutional investors enhances firm innovation. Consistent with the monitoring view, we...