We show that in a duopoly operating in a congested market, with a general congestion function and an arbitrary distribution of consumer disutility for congestion, there cannot exist an asymmetrict Nash equilibrium. We also show tha whenever an equilibrium does exisq it is unique. Closed...

The paper defines a simple tatonnement process of adjustments in prices and quantities, where excess demand results in nominal price increases and excess supply results in quantity rationing of supply at unchanged prices. Under reasonable assumptions, the process converges to a...

A two-stage game is used in this paper to model a long-run market with spatially separated producers and with multi-period demands: first, firmas simultaneously and independently invest their capacities; second, after capacities are set up in the first stage and made public, firms engage in a...

In this paper we analyze a model of proportional representation that allows for both sincere and strategic voting. We prove that strategic voters vote only for the extreme parties in any equilibrium,if the electorate is large.

In this paper, we analyze the trade war between two large countries when the trade policy is decided through majority voting. We show how the trade war equilibrium depends on the median voter production factor relative endowment. We compare this equilibrium to the one analyzed by Johnson where...

This paper develops a family of autoregressive conditional duration (ACD) models that encompasses most specifications in the literature. The nesting relies on a Box-Cox transformation with shape parameter to the conditional duration process and a possibly asymmetric shocks impact curve.

In this note, we consider a negotiation model wherein a simultaneous voting game, which endogenizes the choice of the bargaining procedur, is introduced.

The citizen-debate approach, proposed to study the performance of representative democracies, builds on a multi-stage game where the same agents are asked whether or not to become a candidate and, successively, to vote. Consistently, the solution concept adopted in Besley and Coate (1997)...

The competitive equilibrium correspondence, which associates equilibrium prices of commodities and assets with allocations of endowments, identifies the preferences and beliefs of individals also under uncertainty; this is the case even if the asset market is incomplete.

In this note we show that, for generic plurality games (i.e., voting games under plurality rule), an equilibrium that induces a mixed distribution over the outcomes (i.e., with two or more candidates elected with positive probability), is regular and hence, a Mertens' stable set.