In a multiperiod economy with incomplete markets and assets that exhibit a payoff depending on price history, we show that one need not perturb back office and settlement feature of assets to get endowment generic existence of an equilibrium. We exhibit a class of assets -transverse assets - and...

The general purpose of this paper is to prove quasiequilibrium existence theorems for production economies with general consumption sets in an infinite dimensional commodity space, without assuming any monotonicity of preferences or free-disposal in production.

We show that in a duopoly operating in a congested market, with a general congestion function and an arbitrary distribution of consumer disutility for congestion, there cannot exist an asymmetrict Nash equilibrium. We also show tha whenever an equilibrium does exisq it is unique. Closed...

This paper studies utility interdependence in the laboratory. We design an experiment where subjects can reduce ("burn") other subjects' money. Those who burn the money of others have to give up some of their own cash. Despite this cost, and contrary to the assumptions of economics textbooks,...

This note deals with Cournot type oligopolies in which the market clearing price occasionally may be non-unique. A Stackelberg leading producer is present. Given that setting we explore continuity properties of the followers' reaction and provide sufficient conditions for existence of equilibrium.

We study a class of common-value second-price auctions with differential information. This class of common-value auctions is characterized by the property that each player's information set is connected with respect to the common value. We show that the entire class is dominance solvable,...

The authors study market games with multiple posts per commodity. They provide some facts that characterize prices of commodities across posts and show some interesting results.

In market games the one to one correspondence between commodity types and trading posts would be justified if it were true that the set of equilibria is not affected by the number of trading posts postulated at the ouset of the model. We show that this is not true.

We study a general model of common-value second-price auctions with differential information. We show that one of the bidders has an inform tion advantage over the other bidders if and only if he possesses dominantstrategy. A dominant strategy is in fact unique and is given by the conditional...

This paper analyses the situation of an incumbent monopoly who has both to signal that her costs are low in order to dissuade entry tomorrow, and that her product has a high quality in order to attract consumers in the current period. The incumbent can use both price and advertising as signals....