Inventors and producers bargain over royalties to license multiple patented inventions. In the first stage of the bargaining game, inventors offer licenses to producers and producers demand licenses. In the second stage of the game, inventors and producers engage in bilateral bargaining over...

A price reversal pattern of ARV drugs was noted across lower and middle income countries in that the lower-income countries have higher prices relative to higher-income countries based on a 2008-2009 Summary Report by World Health Organization. The transaction costs affecting AVR drug pricing...

We extend the Kamien and Tauman model of patent licensing by introducing heterogeneous licensees that differ in their marginal costs using the licensed technology. We show that price discrimination does not necessarily ensure an efficient allocation of licenses. Moreover, it is possible that...

This paper presents an easy-to-use measure of patent scope that is grounded both in patent law and in the practices of patent attorneys. We validate our measure by showing both that patent attorneys' subjective assessments of scope agree with our estimates, and that the behaviour of patenters is...

Current controversies over patent policy place standard-setting organizations (SSOs) on a collision course with antitrust law. Recent theoretical research conjectures that, in an SSO, patent owners can “hold up” patent users in the sense of demanding high royalties for a patented input after...

We consider how patent rights and price regulation affect whether new drugs are marketed in a country, and how quickly. The analysis covers a large sample of 68 countries at all income levels and includes all drug launches over the period 1982-2002. It uses newly compiled information on legal...