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relates to the candidates type . Delegation is then superior to direct (owner) recruitment and offering tenure or guaranteed …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011514022
This article analyzes under which conditions a manager can motivate a junior worker by verbal communication, and explains why communication is often tied up with organizational choices as job enlargement and collaboration. Our model has two important features. First, the manager has more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335224
-employee relationship. We study a model of delegation with an informed agent, where the principal may impose money-burning on the agent as a … some results novel to the delegation literature. First, money-burning is more likely if the principal is more sensitive to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011524157
Supplementary Appendix to "Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives."The paper "Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives" to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011524158
relates to the candidates' 'type'. Delegation is then superior to direct (owner) recruitment and offering 'tenure' or …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001731780
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003187613
The importance of fair and equal treatment of workers is at the heart of the debate in organizational management. In this regard, we study how reward mechanisms and production technologies affect effort provision in teams. Our experimental results demonstrate that unequal rewards can potentially...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003612759
Two alternative relative compensation schemes are compared with respect to total output that can be generated at a given sum of salaries. While the promotion regime guarantees that any salary increase is permanent, the premium system allows a reduction in the income of an agent to the base...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398044
The importance of fair and equal treatment of workers is at the heart of the debate in organizational management. In this regard, we study how reward mechanisms and production technologies affect effort provision in teams. Our experimental results demonstrate that unequal rewards can potentially...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003800929
We analyze the Moral Hazard problem, assuming that agents are inequity averse. Our results differ from conventional contract theory and are more in line with empirical findings than standard results. We find: First, inequity aversion alters the structure of optimal contracts. Second, there is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003011503