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Fairness, adverse selection, and employment contracts

Siemens, Ferdinand von - 2005

extent of their fairness concerns. Fairness is modelled as inequity aversion, where fair-minded workers suffer if their … colleagues get more income net of production costs. Screening workers with equal productivity but different fairness concerns is … the fraction of fair-minded workers. As a result, fairness might influence the employment contracts of all workers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366541

Fairness, adverse selection, and employment contracts

Siemens, Ferdinand von - 2005 - This Version: July 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010440434

Hidden Costs of Control Under Aligned Monetary Incentives

Aimone, Jason Anthony - 2016

Several experimental studies have demonstrated the importance of non-monetary preferences in determining agents' response to control and delegation when monetary incentives between agents and principals are not aligned, but little is known about how such preferences influence the principle agent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013004422

Delegation Games : A Game Theoretical Perspective for Managerial Incentives

Akbulut Merchant, Cigdem; Jansen, Thijs; van Lier, Arie - 2017

Companies employ managers for either practical, legal or administrative reasons. However, no matter what the reason, the good performance of managers and the success of companies are vital elements for firms. At this point, managerial incentives play a key role. In this paper, we use the VFJS...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014034936

Committing to incentives : should the decision to sanction be revealed or hidden?

Klempt, Charlotte; Pull, Kerstin - 2010

Sanctions are widely used to promote compliance in principal-agent-relationships. While there is ample evidence confirming the predicted positive incentive effect of sanctions, it has also been shown that imposing sanctions may in fact reduce compliance by crowding-out intrinsic motivation. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003944178

Bonus and Malus in Principal-Agent Relations with Fixed Pay and Real Effort

Kirstein, Annette - 2008

Drawing on the proposer-responder game examined by Andreoni, Harbaugh, and Vesterlund (2003), I experimentally test four variations of a principal-agent relationship with fixed pay and real effort. Depending on the treatment, the principal can voluntarily, but at her own expense, (1) only reward...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012769841

Incentive magnitude effects in experimental games : bigger is not necessarily better

Pulford, Briony D.; Colman, Andrew M.; Loomes, Graham - In: Games 9 (2018) 1/4, pp. 1-10

In experimental games, task-related incentives are payments to experimental subjects that vary according to their strategy choices and the consequent outcomes of the games. Limited evidence exists regarding incentive magnitude effects in experimental games. We examined one-off strategy choices...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011848336

Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay - an Experiment on Incentives and Sorting

Eriksson, Tor; Villeval, Marie Claire - 2021

Variable pay not only creates a link between pay and performance but may also help firms in attracting the more productive employees (Lazear 1986, 2000). However, due to lack of natural data, empirical analyses of the relative importance of the selection and incentive effects of pay schemes are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319186

Incentives, self-selection, and coordination of motivated agents for the production of social goods

Bauer, Kevin; Kosfeld, Michael; Siemens, Ferdinand von - 2021

We study, theoretically and empirically, the effects of incentives on the self-selection and coordination of motivated agents to produce a social good. Agents join teams where they allocate effort to either generate individual monetary rewards (selfish effort) or contribute to the production of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012599052

Incentives, Self-Selection, and Coordination of Motivated Agents for the Production of Social Goods

Bauer, Kevin; Kosfeld, Michael; von Siemens, Ferdinand - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013217557

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