Showing 1 - 10 of 4,745
This paper analyzes relational contracts under moral hazard. We first show that if the available information (signal) about effort satisfies a generalized monotone likelihood ratio property, then irrespective of whether the first-order approach (FOA) is valid or not, the optimal bonus scheme...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012920164
provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit incentive contracts when there are some fair-minded players. But …, which offer important new insights into the interaction of contract choices, fairness and incentives. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371080
actors provide powerful incentives and become superior when there are some fair-minded players. The principals understand … enforcement power of explicit and implicit incentives. This contract preference is associated with the fact that explicit … incentives weaken the enforcement power of implicit bonus incentives significantly. Our results are largely consistent with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010440446
thus far puzzling use of non-linear incentives, for example in sales-force compensation. The result is obtained by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009699416
This paper examines the optimal provision of incentives for contract designers. A principal hires an agent to draft a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013213552
flattening of the high-powered incentives. Methodologically, we provide a tractable way to formulate and characterize optimal … robustness and simplicity of dynamic contracts, in particular that presence of ambiguity flattens high-powered incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013313165
In venture capital markets, contracts between investors and enterprises stipulate special incentives and restrictions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012995899
We address empirically the issues of the optimality of simple linear compensation contracts and the importance of asymmetries between firms and workers. For that purpose, we consider contracts between the French National Institute of Statistics and Economics (Insee) and the interviewers it hired...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012202372
size and team composition as instruments in order to improve incentives. In particular, the principal can strengthen the … agents' incentives by composing teams that utilize stochastic dependencies between the agents' outputs. We also show that … more agents in the team may under certain conditions increase each team member's effort incentives, in particular if …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012977358
This paper analyses and compares optimal relational contracts between a principal/firm and a set of agents when (a) only aggregate output can be observed, and (b) individual outputs can be observed. We show that the optimal contract under (a) is a team incentive scheme where each agent is paid a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013060801